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Abstract
Background: The evolutionary origin of cooperation among unrelated individuals remains a key unsolved issue across
several disciplines. Prominent among the several mechanisms proposed to explain how cooperation can emerge is the
existence of a population structure that determines the interactions among individuals. Many models have explored
analytically and by simulation the effects of such a structure, particularly in the framework of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but
the results of these models largely depend on details such as the type of spatial structure or the evolutionary dynamics.
Therefore, experimental work suitably designed to address this question is needed to probe these issues.
Methods and Findings: We have designed an experiment to test the emergence of cooperation when humans play
Prisoner’s Dilemma on a network whose size is comparable to that of simulations. We find that the cooperation level
declines to an asymptotic state with low but nonzero cooperation. Regarding players’ behavior, we observe that the
population is heterogeneous, consisting of a high percentage of defectors, a smaller one of cooperators, and a large group
that shares features of the conditional cooperators of public goods games. We propose an agent-based model based on the
coexistence of these different strategies that is in good agreement with all the experimental observations.
Conclusions: In our large experimental setup, cooperation was not promoted by the existence of a lattice beyond a residual
level (around 20%) typical of public goods experiments. Our findings also indicate that both heterogeneity and a ‘‘moody’’
conditional cooperation strategy, in which the probability of cooperating also depends on the player’s previous action, are
required to understand the outcome of the experiment. These results could impact the way game theory on graphs is used
to model human interactions in structured groups.
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Introduction
The mechanisms underlying the emergence of cooperation are
as yet an unsolved puzzle. Understanding them is key because all
major transitions in evolution involve the spreading of some sort of
cooperative behavior [1], bringing about a higher level of
complexity. But cooperation is costly and amenable to free-riding
by defectors, so a mechanism that favors the assortative interaction
of cooperators is required to transform cooperation into the most
profitable strategy [2]. As cooperation is observed in biological and
social systems alike, different mechanisms stressing particular
aspects of these different disciplines have been proposed to explain
cooperation [3]. One such route is the existence of a (social,
spatial, geographical) structure that determines the interactions
among individuals in the population [4,5]. A great deal of research
has been devoted to understand the effects of population structure
on cooperation [6,7]. Most of those works have studied the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) as the paradigmatic framework in which
cooperation is the socially desirable outcome but is dominated by
the rationality of defection [4,8,9]. However, this large body of
research has not been conclusive because model details, chiefly the
type of spatial structure and the evolutionary dynamics [7,10], lead
to dramatic differences between predictions. Therefore, experi-
mental work beyond the large body of results on the PD on
unstructured populations [11,12] is needed to ascertain both the
relevance of the population structure and the types of dynamics
that are actually at work in real situations.
To progress towards answering these two questions we have
focused on the pioneering model studied by Nowak and May [5].
They simulated a set of agents located on a square lattice, playing
a PD with their Moore neighborhood (i.e., playing a PD with each
of their eight neighbors, but using the same strategy in all of them),
and showed that when they imitated the behavior of their
neighbor who obtained the largest payoff in the previous round
(including themselves), cooperation could thrive even under very
adverse choices of the payoffs. Inspired by this, we have carried
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network, with a setup as close as possible to the one of Nowak and
May’s simulations. In this respect, it is important to note that in
those simulations agents do not have memory and update their
strategies with a specific, fixed rule, whereas we are implementing
the same system with humans. It is clear that the rules used by
humans are unknown a priori (they are not instructed to follow
any particular rule), hence the goal of the experiment is precisely
to unveil the way they behave.
Specifically, 169 volunteers were located on a (virtual) 13|13
square lattice with periodic boundary conditions, on which they
were able to interact anonymously. This is by far the largest
experiment of this kind ever carried out, and organizational
difficulties as well as increasing costs prevent from working with
much larger systems. In fact, to our knowledge, experimental work
on this issue has been conducted only recently and on networks an
order of magnitude smaller [13,14], and only one has addressed
the questions we are interested in here, using 4|4 lattices [15].
The question of the size of the network is very important, because
the putative mechanism leading to the emergence of cooperation
[10,16] is the appearance of clusters of cooperators. Cooperator
clustering can be difficult to observe in small systems, hence the
necessity of studying larger ones and, in addition, for times as long
as possible [17].
Results
Experimental setup
In our experiment, volunteers played a 2|2 PD game with
each of their eight neighbors (Moore neighborhood) taking only
one action, either to cooperate (C) or to defect (D), the action
being the same against all the opponents. The resulting payoff was
calculated by adding all eight interaction payoffs. Payoffs of the
PD game were set to be 7 cents of a euro for mutual cooperation,
10 cents for a defector facing a cooperator, and 0 cents for any
player facing a defector (weak PD [5]). With this choice (a
cooperator and a defector receive the same payoff against a
defector) defection is not a risk dominant strategy, which enhances
the possibility that cooperation emerges. In addition, to avoid
framing effects, the two actions were always referred to in terms of
colors (blue for C and yellow for D), and the game was never
referred to as PD in the material handed to the volunteers. This
notwithstanding, players were properly informed of the conse-
quences of choosing each action, and some examples were given to
them in the introduction. After every round players were given the
information of the actions taken by their neighbors and their
corresponding payoffs.
The full experiment consisted of three parts: experiment 1,
control, and experiment 2. In experiment 1 players remained at
the same positions in the lattice with the same neighbors
throughout the experiment. In the control part we removed the
effect of the lattice by shuffling players every round. Finally, in
experiment 2 players were again fixed on a lattice, albeit different
from that of experiment 1. On the screen players saw the actions
and payoffs of their neighbors from the previous round, who in the
control part were different from their current neighbors with high
probability. All three parts of the experiment were carried out in
sequence with the same players. Players were also fully informed of
the different setups they were going to run through. The number
of rounds in each part was randomly chosen between 40 and 60 in
order to avoid players knowing in advance when it was going to
finish, resulting in 47, 60, and 58 rounds for experiment 1, control,
and experiment 2, respectively.
Global cooperative behavior
We begin the presentation of the results of our experiment by
discussing the first issue, namely the global cooperation level.
Figure 1 represents the total percentage of cooperative actions in
every round of the three parts of the experiment. Experiment 1
begins with a very large percentage of cooperation, above 50%,
that rapidly decays to reach a more or less constant level after
some 25 rounds. Experiment 2 exhibits the same behavior, but the
initial cooperation level is much lower, a 32%, and the transient
shorter. On the contrary, the control part shows a constant
fraction of cooperative actions, fluctuating around 20%. This is a
clear indication that players did realize that the fact that neighbors
changed after every round made it hopeless to try to achieve a
mutually profitable environment, which they did attempt to
establish at the beginning of experiment 1 (particularly so) and
experiment 2. On the other hand, after the initial transient, the
amounts of cooperation observed in the two experiments and in
the control part coincide approximately, showing that the
existence of a fixed lattice structure has little influence on the
players’ asymptotic behavior.
Our conclusion that the lattice has little influence for the global
cooperation level and our observed results are in good agreement
with those reported by Traulsen et al. [15], although in their case
they also observe high initial cooperation levels in the well-mixed
case, most likely because in their setup these players were
beginning their participation without prior experience. We note
also that their experiment is shorter in time than ours, with a
duration comparable to the length of our transient (they do not
observe a stationary state, as we do, as noted also in [17]). In spite
of that, it appears that their asymptotic value for cooperation is
compatible with the 20% value we found. On the other hand, the
differences between the results of experiments 1 and 2 cannot be
attributed to the different distributions of players on the lattice: A
learning process has occurred that has led players to use a better
defined strategy in experiment 2. This is not only evident in the
shorter transient period and the lower starting level of cooperation
in experiment 2 compared to experiment 1, but it also shows up in
many other features that we will be commenting on in the
remaining of this article.
Testing the ‘‘imitate-the-best’’ strategy
Our experiment has been set up to mimic Nowak and May’s
simulations as close as possible. As the system sizes considered in
[5] were larger than our experimental lattice, we have repeated
their simulations on a 13|13 lattice with the payoffs of the
experiment. We also used the same update rule, ‘‘imitate-the-best’’
—copying the action of the neighbor that performed the best
provided it was better than their own—. The results show that the
asymptotic level of cooperation is either 0 or a large value close to
1, depending on the initial condition, while an outcome with the
level of cooperation observed in the experiment is never found.
This suggests that either players do not update their actions with
an imitate-the-best rule, or memory effects, absent in [5], are
important —or both. We will analyze the behavior of the players
in terms of their previous actions and those of their neighbors in
the next section. Presently, we will check to what extent imitation
plays a role in our experiment. To that purpose we have computed
the fraction of actions that can be interpreted as imitation of the
best action in the neighborhood along the experiment, yielding the
values 0:7149 for experiment 1 and 0:7687 for experiment 2. In
spite of their being both above 70% one should bear in mind that
there are only two actions to choose from and pure chance may be
mistaken for imitation. To ascertain the statistical significance of
these values we applied a non-parametric bootstrap [18] method,
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positions of the players while keeping their sequences of actions
during the experiments, and computing the corresponding
fractions of imitation. This provides the empirical probability
distributions of the null hypothesis ‘‘imitation is due to chance’’.
The mean values of these distributions are 0:7145+0:0014 for
experiment 1 and 0:7678+0:0013 for experiment 2, and values
larger than the one we find can be obtained with probability
p~0:425 in experiment 1 and p~0:282 in experiment 2. This
proves that the observed imitation is not significantly different
from the apparent imitation yielded by pure chance. This result,
which is consistent with the low level of cooperation observed
(players using imitate-the-best should lead the system to higher
cooperation) and with the responses to the questionnaires at the
end of the experiment (no one claimed to have imitated the best
neighbor), makes it plausible to conclude that imitate-the-best is
not an appropriate explanation of players’ behavior (although
strictly speaking, this statistical analysis does not allow us to
definitely rule out this strategy).
Analysis of players’ strategies during the experiment
To make further progress towards clarifying the question of the
dynamics of strategies, we considered as an alternative strategy
update rule the possibility that players react to the number of
cooperative neighbors (k~0,1,...,8) they observed in the
previous round (henceforth a context), i.e., we assume that they
have one-step memory. This is a reasonable assumption in view
that questionnaires suggest that players take into account what
their neighbors do. Furthermore, Traulsen et al. [15] briefly report
that cooperative actions are more frequent in more cooperative
environments. Therefore, we specifically computed from the
experimental data the average frequency with which players
cooperated, conditioned to both their previous action and their
context, and made linear fits to these frequencies [Figures 2(a) and
(b) and Table 1]. The first observation is that players’ reactions to
the context depend strongly on the past action of the focus player,
something that to our knowledge has never been reported. The
significance of this result can be assessed by comparing with the
result obtained averaging over a thousand shufflings of the players
in the lattice [Figures 2(g) and (h)], which show no dependence on
the context. On the other hand, the differences observed in the fits
of the two experiments provide another hint that players are using
a better defined strategy in experiment 2, after having ‘‘learnt’’ in
the two previous phases of the experiment. Using these fits as a
model (henceforth homogeneous model), we made simulations in a
13|13 lattice in which all players react according to these rules,
with an initial condition similar to the one found in the
experiments. This model is able to reproduce the observed
asymptotic level of cooperation in both experiments, predicting an
asymptotic value of 28% for experiment 1 and of 22% for
experiment 2, but fails to reproduce other features. For instance, it
leads to a histogram of total earnings much narrower than the
experimental one, and the distribution of fractions of cooperative
actions among players reveals that it does not capture a significant
fraction of stubborn defectors and cooperators that appear in the
experiment (see Figure 3).
We then tried to distinguish different kinds of behavior shown
by players. First we found a sizeable number of pure defectors, as well
as a few pure cooperators, in all three stages of the experiments —i.e.,
players who always defected/cooperated irrespective of the actions
of their neighbors. Taking these individuals out, we still were able
to classify the remaining players into three groups: Mostly defectors
(people who defected more than 2/3 of the times in any context),
mostly cooperators (cooperated more than 2/3 of the times in any
Figure 1. The cooperation level declines to a low but non-zero level. Fraction of cooperators in every round of the three parts of the
experiment (in the first and the last ones players remain in the same node of the lattice along the whole experiment, whereas in the control part
players are shuffled every round). Players are arranged in a 13|13 lattice with periodic boundary conditions, and play a PD game with each of its 8
surrounding neighbors in the lattice. With the notation C for cooperation, D for defection, and p(X,Y) for the payoff obtained by a player who plays
X against an opponent who plays Y, the payoff matrix of each of these PD games is p(C,C)~7 cents of a euro, p(C,D)~0 cents, p(D,C)~10 cents,
and p(D,D)~0 cents. These payoffs conform a weak PD game —the most favorable to promote cooperation— because p(C,D)~p(D,D). This setup
is entirely similar to that of Nowak and May’s simulations [5] except for the size of the lattice (simulations are performed on n|n lattices, with nw20)
and the lack of self-interactions (see [17] for further comments).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013749.g001
Humans Playing a Spatial PD
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 November 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 11 | e13749context), and generalized conditional cooperators (players who
seem to react to the context as before), which we hereafter refer to
as moody conditional cooperators —indicating that their propensity to
cooperate depends on their previous action, or ‘‘mood’’. Their
amounts are listed in Table 2 and we have checked that this
classification is consistent with the answers that players provided in
their questionnaires. It is remarkable that the classification is very
similar to the one reported by Fischbacher et al. [19] in public
goods experiments, and confirmed in subsequent papers (see, e.g.,
[20] for a review and [11] for a general review about public goods
experiments), even if they do not report the ‘‘moody’’ behavior of
conditional cooperators. This is an important feature of their
behavior because, as can be seen in Figures 2(a) and (b), the
probability that a moody conditional cooperator cooperates after
having defected in the previous round turns out to be slightly non-
increasing as a function of the number of cooperators in the
context.
It is worthwhile to compare the behavior of conditional
cooperators in the two experiments [either Figures 2(a) and (b)
or 2(d) and (e)] and in the control part [Figure 2(c) or 2(f),
respectively]. The different behavior that can be observed strongly
suggests that this strategy arises as a result of direct reciprocity.
Whereas in the two experiments conditional cooperators who
cooperated in the previous action cooperate more the more
neighbors cooperate, it is quite the opposite in the control
experiment. Indeed, it makes no sense to reciprocate or retaliate in
this control experiment because the recipients of your action are
—with high probability— no more your previous opponents.
Cooperator clustering
Once we have a classification of the players, we are in a position
to address another issue about the lack of global cooperative
behavior, namely the assortment or clustering of cooperators. The
low level of cooperation we observe is in agreement with the fact
Figure 2. Context-dependent behavior depends also on the player’s previous action or ‘‘mood’’. Probabilities of cooperating after
playing C or D, conditioned to the context (number of cooperators in the previous round). Panels (a)–(c) show results for all players, whereas panels
(d)–(f) show results for the group of players referred to as conditional cooperators. Panels (a) and (d) correspond to results of experiment 1, panels (b)
and (e) to experiment 2, and panels (c) and (f) to the control experiment. The parameters of the linear fits can be found in Table 1. The plots
demonstrate that there is a strong dependence on the context for players that cooperated in the previous round (i.e., were in a ‘‘cooperative mood’’),
the cooperation probability increasing rapidly as a function of the number of cooperative neighbors in a manner similar to the conditional
cooperators found by Fischbacher et al. [19]. However, after having defected, players behave in a manner that shares features of exploiting behavior,
cooperating with equal or less probability as the number of cooperators in their neighborhood increases. The very different behavior of players in the
control experiment illustrates that conditional cooperation arises as a direct reciprocity effect —which is pointless if neighbors change every round.
The conditioning of cooperation to the previous round is different in both experiments, which provides a strong indication that players learnt to play
as the experiment proceeded, moody conditional cooperation being more clearly observed in the plots corresponding to experiment 2. Finally,
panels (g)–(i) show the probabilities of cooperating after playing C or D, conditioned to the context (number of cooperators in the previous round),
averaged over 1000 random shufflings of players in the lattice. Panel (g) corresponds to experiment 1, panel (h) to experiment 2, and panel (i) to the
control experiment. The results show that there is no dependence on the context, proving that the dependence revealed in panels (a)–(f) is
statistically significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013749.g002
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almost always cooperative— do not cluster in space even if they are
initially a majority, as in experiment 1. Interestingly though, the few
cooperators in experiment 2 are somewhat clustered, and in both
experiment 1 and 2, defectors show a slight anti-clustering trend:
This can indeed be seen in Table 3, where we collect the average
number of neighbors of the same type for the three types of players
(pure and mostly cooperators, pure and mostly defectors, and
conditional cooperators), as obtained from the experimental data.
This average is computed, for each type of player, as the sum of
pairsofneighborsofthe giventype divided bythenumberofplayers
of that type. We resorted again to non-parametric bootstrapping to
assign significance to those values, computing the average number
of neighbors of the same type in a thousand random shufflings of
players. The experimental values are always within the confidence
interval of the null model, except for a few cases (in boldface in
Table 3) that are particularly important because they suggest some
cooperator clustering as well as some defector anti-clustering,
precisely the cooperation fostering mechanism put forward by
Figure 3. The heterogeneous model reproduces the earning and cooperation histograms and supports the coexistence of different
types of players. Panels (a) and (b): Histograms of earnings in simulations of the heterogeneous model, for all players aggregated (black line,
hidden by the blue line) as well as for the three basic types of players: pure and mostly cooperators (red line), pure and mostly defectors (green line),
and conditional cooperators (blue line); histograms of earnings in simulations of the homogeneous model (orange line); and experimental histograms
of earnings for all players aggregated (black dots). Results are presented for both experiment 1 (a) and experiment 2 (b). Simulations results are
averages over 1000 runs. Crosses (|) represent the mean earnings in the real experiments (their Y coordinate is arbitrary). Error bars span two
standard deviations. Clearly, simulations of the homogeneous model do not fit the experimental data, thus supporting the introduction of the
heterogeneous model. There is a reasonable consistency between experimental results and numerical simulations for the heterogeneous model,
more so in experiment 2, where players are supposed to be playing with a better defined strategy. In experiment 1, the longer cooperative transient
makes defection a more favorable strategy. The fact that the histograms for the different kinds of players are indistinguishable supports the
coexistence of strategies, as there is no real incentive (on average) to switch from one strategy to any other. Panels (c) and (d): Number of players who
cooperate a given number of rounds, both for experiment 1 (c) and experiment 2 (d). The experimental results are plotted together with the results of
simulations with the homogeneous and the heterogeneous models, averaged over 1000 realizations. Once again, the homogeneous model is not
able to reproduce the experimental results.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013749.g003
Table 1. Linear fits to the probabilities of cooperating as a
function of the context.
type of
data aC bC aD bD
exp. 1, all
players
0:021+0:005 0:441+0:015 {0:013+0:005 0:225+0:015
exp. 2, all
players
0:091+0:009 0:381+0:022 {0:013+0:002 0:149+0:005
exp. 1,
cond. coop.
0:031+0:003 0:413+0:008 0:002+0:007 0:254+0:018
exp. 2,
cond. coop.
0:080+0:010 0:345+0:022 {0:009+0:004 0:224+0:009
Fits are defined by Pr(CDX,k)~aXkzbX, where X~C,D is the player’s action
in the previous round and k~0,1,...,8 is the number of cooperators in the
neighborhood in the previous round.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013749.t001
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clustering of cooperators when the largest number of them we
observe (that of experiment 2) is just nine.
Heterogeneous model
In order to assess the validity of our understanding of the players’
behavior we designed a new model implementing heterogeneity by
starting from the same amounts of each of the five types of players
(themodelisreferredtoasheterogeneousmodel).Inthesimulationsevery
player behaves according to her type, and for the generalized
conditional cooperators we employed a model similar to the
homogeneous one, but this time computing the average probabilities
only for conditional cooperators [see Figures 2(d) and (e) and
Table 1]. This heterogeneous model succeeds in reproducing even
the featuresthat the homogeneousmodeldoes not capture. Tobegin
with, the global cooperation level is 28% for experiment 1 and 23%
for experiment 2, in agreement with the experimental results.
Furthermore, Figure 3(a) and (b) shows a comparison of the
histogram of earnings, for all players aggregated and separated by
types, as obtained from the two models (homogeneous and
heterogeneous) and from the experiment. We can observe that
experimental data are consistent with the simulations of the
heterogeneous model, whereas the homogeneous model deviates
from the experimental results (typically, as we already mentioned, it
has a noticeably narrower distribution of earnings). This picture also
shows that the distribution of earnings is the same for all kinds of
players, clearly in the simulations but also in the experimental data,
mainly in experiment 2. The slight advantage of defectors in
experiment 1 is surely due to the longer cooperative transient. This
advantagedisappearsinexperiment2,whereplayersaresupposedto
havelearntand to beusing amoredefinite strategy.Wenotethat the
fact that payoffs are very similar for the different strategies supports
their coexistence, as there is no real incentive (on average) to switch
between them. Interestingly, a similar result was found in
experiments on modified public goods games by Kurzban and
Houser [21]. A further evidence infavor of the heterogeneous model
is revealed by the histogram of cooperative actions occurred in both
experiments [Figure 3(c) and (d)]. The homogeneous model shows a
Gaussian-like peak, whereas the heterogeneous model shows a more
widespread distribution, closer to the experimental one.
Alternative interpretations of players’ strategies
The fact that Figure 2 reveals that the probability of cooperating
after having defected in the previous round is both low and
independent on the context, might suggest that the strategy actually
employed by conditional cooperators is a version of GRIM. GRIM
is a strategy of the so called ‘‘trigger’’ type, first introduced by
Friedman [22]. This strategy amounts to cooperating until
disappointment (by the lack of cooperation of the partners), and
defecting from then on. Thus defined, GRIM plays an important
role for proving theoretical results ingame theory(see, e.g., [23,24]).
Forourpresentpurposes,letusnotethatifalloramajorityofagents
use this strategy, it is clear that as soon as one defects, a cascade of
permanent retaliation is initiated until full defection dominates the
system. This is the reason why in the famous experiments by
Axelrod about the PD game GRIM did not perform very well (cf.
[4], where GRIM is referred to as FRIEDMAN). In our experiment
we observe a background of cooperative actions near 20%, but
perhaps players are using a weaker version of GRIM in which the
final defection is ‘noisy’ in the same percentage. Alternatively,
players could be progressively switching from an initial conditional
cooperative strategy to a more defective strategy through some
learning process (see, e.g., [12] for a review of the different learning
processes that could be at work). In both cases the result found in
Figure 2 for the probability of cooperating after having cooperated
in the previous round would just be a consequence of the actions
taken by these players during the transient, in the first rounds of
both experiments, and the asymptotically surviving strategy would
be noisy defection, regardless of the context.
To test this alternative explanation, we have carried out an
analysis of the conditional strategies at different times during the
game. If any of these two strategies is at use, this analysis should
reveal a change in the probabilities shown in Figure 2 over time; in
particular, we should observe a decay of the probability of
cooperating after having cooperated in the previous round. We
do not have enough statistics to test the strategies every round of the
game, but we can do it along two different intervals: in the first 20
rounds and in the last 20 rounds. Did the player use any GRIM-like
strategy, either as such or through a learning process, the results of
the analysis in these two periods should be different, as least as far as
cooperative strategiesareconcerned.InFigure4weshowtheresults
of this analysis. We do not observe any significant change in the
results for experiment 2, and for experiment 1 we only appreciate a
small decay of the probability of cooperating after having defected.
These results rule out the interpretation of players’ strategies as
GRIM or as‘learning-to-defect’, withtheexception,inthislast case,
of the small effect just pointed out. Our result is in agreement with
recent experimental findings [25] that in an infinitely repeated PD
game GRIM explains some of the data, but its proportion is not
statistically significant. It seems that during experiment 1 the
probability that a player restores cooperation gets adjusted as time
passes, decreasing towards values compatible with the stable value
found in experiment 2. On the other hand, there is, of course, the
Table 2. Evidence for heterogeneity in the behavior of the
population.
type of player experiment 1 control experiment 2
pure cooperators 1 1 6
mostly cooperators 2 2 3
conditional cooperators 125 92 91
mostly defectors 26 36 36
pure defectors 15 38 33
Frequency of the different types of players in the three parts of the experiment.
Mostly defectors are people who defected more than 2/3 of the times in any
context, mostly cooperators are those who cooperated more than 2/3 of the
times in any context, and conditional cooperators follow the strategy described
in the main text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013749.t002
Table 3. Average number of neighbors of the same type.
type experiment 1 experiment 2
exper. mean SD exper. mean SD
cooperator 0.0000 0.0946 0.2383 1.3333 0.3905 0.2740
cond. coop. 5.8560 5.9048 0.0819 4.1758 4.2855 0.1438
defector 1.6585 1.9163 0.2353 2.9565 3.2404 0.1823
The column exper. lists the average number of neighbors of the same type for
the three types of players, computed, for each type of player, as the sum of
pairs of neighbors of the given type divided by the number of players of that
type. The columns mean and SD list the means and standard deviations of the
values obtained in 1000 random shufflings of players.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013749.t003
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also attributable to some kind of learning. Particularly interesting is
the stability of the strategies along experiment 2, consistent with the
idea that players had a more precise idea of how to play in this
second experiment than they had in the first one.
Discussion
The large size of our experimental setup and the data analysis
presented above allow us to contribute to the two questions we
wanted to address. First, we have observed that the existence of a
lattice giving structure to a population playing PD does not lead to
an increase of the cooperation level, even if as in our case the PD is
weak. Thus, subjects behave as if they were playing a repeated
public goods game, the fact that the game in which a player is
involved overlaps with those of their neighbors having very little
influence on the observed asymptotic level of cooperation. Second,
regarding the manner in which people update their strategies, we
have not found evidence in favor of imitate-the-best behavior, in
agreement with the analysis in [14,15]. These two observations
imply in turn that the model simulated in [5] does not describe our
experiment with human subjects —albeit it may of course be
applicable in many other instances such as, e.g., experiments with
bacteria. We then analyzed the way subjects behaved by
considering that they might be influenced by the previous actions
of their neighbors. This analysis has allowed us to make some
Figure 4. Conditional cooperators’ strategies (almost) do not change over time. Same as Figure 2 for the case with all players in
experiments 1 (a) and 2 (b). Straight lines are the fit appearing in Figure 2, whereas points are the strategies as obtained only from the first 20 rounds
(full symbols) and only from the last 20 rounds (empty symbols). The strategies are statistically the same for experiment 2, and for the experiment 1
after having played C in the previous round. After having played D in the previous round in experiment 1, the probability of cooperating noticeably
decreases over time down to a value compatible with that observed in experiment 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013749.g004
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important conclusions about individual learning models. The first
one is that there is a large degree of heterogeneity, with an
important fraction (25–45%) of players sticking to a strategy of
(almost) always defect or cooperate. This is a crucial observation
because the experimental results are not recovered unless those
individuals are included in the modeling. The analysis of the total
earnings of players also suggests that this heterogeneity can be
evolutionarily stable, in the sense that all strategies are (on average)
equally profitable, as observed also in [21] (some theoretical
support for the evolutionary stability of a simplified model of
conditional cooperation in the presence of social norms has been
already provided [26]). The second conclusion is that the rest of
the players are well described as moody conditional cooperators,
i.e., players whose probability to choose one action depends on the
amount of cooperation they observe in the previous round and
their own previous action. Our clearest results, those of
experiment 2, show that players have a high chance to continue
cooperation (larger than 50%) if 3 or more neighbors cooperated,
whereas if they had defected in the previous round, their chances
to cooperate in the current one are small and slightly decreasing
with the number of cooperating neighbors. This is consistent with
an exploitation strategy which tries to incentive cooperation in low
cooperative environments and also with a mutualistic strategy
aiming at achieving better global results, something that many
players claim to have done in their responses to the questionnaire.
Indeed, the small resumption of cooperation at the beginning of
experiment 2 as compared to the lack of it in the control indicates
that a number of players hope they can restart cooperation for
either of those two reasons. Our observation that the probability to
cooperate depends on the context agrees with the results in [15],
and improves them by identifying that this probability depends in
turn on the focal individual’s previous action. In addition, our
values for the probabilities are also consistent with their
observation of high levels of ‘‘mutation’’, albeit our results provide
a more intentional interpretation of these probabilities.
The results of this experiment have implications that go beyond
the specific case study of PD on networks. Thus, the dependence
on the player’s own previous action we have found may be
relevant to deepen our understanding of the conditional
cooperation observed in public goods games [19,20]. In addition,
we have proposed a model that, in spite of its simplified description
of heterogeneity, provides a more thorough picture of the way
human subjects might behave in these experiments, as we show
that apparent mutation can be also understood (at least partly) as
conscious changes of behavior arising from cooperative or
exploiting strategies. Indeed, for the first time to the best of our
knowledge, a model is able to reproduce the observed features in
the experiment, from the decline of cooperation through the
earnings distributions to the coexistence of strategies. In this
regard, it is worth noting that recent experiments by Fischbacher
and Ga ¨chter [27] led to an explanation of the decline of
cooperation in public goods games in which heterogeneity seemed
to matter only at the end of the experiment. This is similar to what
we have observed, in so far as our homogeneous model could also
explain how cooperation evolved in time, but other features
crucially required the introduction of heterogeneity. On the other
hand, our observations are not consistent with a vast majority of
the theoretical models of evolutionary games on graphs studied
and simulated so far [6,7]. Our experiment should therefore be a
reference for future, more accurate modeling of these important
social systems, as they strongly indicate that heterogeneity, that
only recently has been considered in theoretical models [28–30], is
a key ingredient to understand human behavior. This is crucial for
the design of mechanisms that promote or at least support
cooperation, one of the goals of this line of research. In this
respect, our work points to avoiding early disappointment of the
agents that leads them to a ‘‘defective mood’’ as an important
aspect to act upon. Finally, the issue of finding an evolutionary
explanation of this coexistence of strategies is a challenge which
should also be addressed to understand human cooperative
behavior.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
All participants in the experiment signed an informed consent to
participate. Besides, their anonymity was always preserved (in
agreement with the Spanish Law for Personal Data Protection) by
letting them randomly choose a closed envelope containing a
username which would identify them in the system and a
password. Final payments were made to carriers of a given
username. No association was ever made between their real names
and the results. As it is standard in socio-economic experiments, no
ethic concerns are involved other than preserving the anonymity
of participants. This was checked and approved by the Vice-
provost of Research of Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, the
institution hosting the experiment.
Description of the experiment
The experiment was carried out with volunteers chosen among
students of the engineering campus of Universidad Carlos III in
Legane ´s (Madrid, Spain). Following a call for participation, we
received about 500 applications, among which we selected 225,
with preference for the youngest ones and keeping a fifty-fifty ratio
of male to female. On the day of the experiment, 178 volunteers
showed up, and we kept 169, so that we could arrange them in a
square lattice with periodic boundary conditions, by discarding the
9 latest arrivals —who were paid their 10 euros show-up fee and
dismissed. All 169 selected participants were then directed to 11
computer rooms in two adjacent buildings, previously prepared by
setting up cardboard panels between posts so that no participant
could look at her physical neighbors (who anyway needed not be
their actual neighbors in the game). They received directions in
paper and also went through a tutorial on the screen, including
questions to check their understanding of the game. When
everybody had gone through the tutorial, the experiment began,
lasting for approximately an hour and a half. The tutorial in
Spanish, or an English translation of it, are available upon request.
At the end of the experiments volunteers were presented a small
questionnaire to fill in. The list of questions (translated into
English) was the following:
1. Describe briefly how you made your decisions in part I
[Experiment 1].
2. Describe briefly how you made your decisions in part II
[Control].
3. Describe briefly how you made your decisions in part III
[Experiment 2].
4. Did you take into account your neighbors’ actions?
5. Is something in the experiment familiar to you? (yes/no).
6. If so, please point out what it reminds you of.
7. If you want to make any comment, please do so below.
The first three questions have a clear motivation, namely to see
whether (possibly some) players did have a strategy to decide on
their actions. Question 4 was intended to check whether players
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only in this last case imitative or conditionally cooperative
strategies make any sense. Questions 5 and 6 focused on the
possibility that some of the players recognized the game as a
Prisoner’s Dilemma because they had a prior knowledge of the
basics of game theory. The final question just allowed them to
enter any additional comment they would like to make. We did
not carry out a more detailed questionnaire to avoid the risk of
many players’ leaving it blank (the whole experiment was already
very long). Immediately after finishing the questionnaire, all
participants received their earnings and their 10 euros show-up
fee. The total earnings of a player in the experiment ranged from
18 to 45 euros.
Software for the experiment was written in PHP 5, Javascript,
and Python. There were 169 client computers running Opera in
kiosk mode (to preclude players from doing anything else than
playing according to the instructions) on Debian Linux. Clients
communicated with a server on which Python programs were
running controlling the experiment, making calculations, and
storing results. Another client was monitoring the whole
experiment, displaying every player and their current status.
The experiment assumes synchronous play, thus we had to
make sure that every round ended in a certain amount of time.
This playing time was set to 30 seconds, which was checked during
the testing phase of the programs to be enough to make a decision,
while at the same time not too long to make the experiment boring
to fast players. If a player did not choose an action within these
30 seconds, the computer made the decision instead. This
automatic decision was randomly chosen to be the player’s
previous action 80% of the times and the opposite action 20% of
the times. We chose this protocol after testing several ones in
simulations. We run simulations in lattices of several sizes,
including the one we used, with two different update rules:
imitate-the-best and proportional updating. At the same time, we
included a fraction of players (up to 15%) who played with a
different update rule. We tested the one we finally chose, along
with similar ones with different probabilities of copying the
previous action. We also tested several other rules. Our finding
was that a fraction below 10% of these ‘‘singular’’ players can
hardly affect the results whichever their update rule. So we
decided to choose the 80–20 rule as the one which could pass
more unnoticed to other players when confronted to it. During the
experiment we monitored the fraction of players who actually
played in each round. We found that in more than 90% of rounds
no more than 4 of the choices were made by the computer. The
largest number of automatic actions occurred at the end of the
control part, but even then their number never goes beyond 8.
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